The No-Rescue Doctrine in the Yania v. Bigan Case
Emergencies are common in daily life and tend to arise at any moment. Whenever another person’s life is at risk, humans naturally want to help, even if it means the rescuer’s life would be in danger (Sterri and Moen 2621). However, when an individual dies due to a crisis, the No-Rescue Doctrine provides the principles to determine whether the rescuer is liable for the unfortunate eventualities. No-Rescue Doctrine and natural law always conflict in such situations. Natural law requires that one has a duty to help a person in distress. On the contrary, the No-Rescue Doctrine does not impose a moral obligation on a person to aid another person in danger, even if the other is at risk of losing their life.
If the courts in New Jersey apply the No-Rescue Doctrine, the survivors of the drowning victim will not succeed in suing for damages due to the stranger’s failure to rescue the victim. Courts in the U.S. have established that a stranger would not be held liable for not helping a person in dire need even if the victim is losing their life. That means even the courts in New Jersey do not impose the moral obligation of common humanity on another individual to aid a person in distress, regardless of how life-threatening the situation is (Sterri and Moen 2626). I agree with the court decision because a stranger should knowingly and willingly make uncoerced decisions to risk their life to rescue another person. Additionally, the drowning person might have entered the river knowing the perils but trusted their swimming skills. Therefore, the consequences of their experiment duly rested upon them and no one else.
Natural law theorists such as Thomas Aquinas or John Finnis believe humans have intrinsic values governing their behavior and reasoning. Values influence an individual’s ability to determine what is wrong or right. John Finnis holds the view that practical reasonableness, religion, and friendship are some of the primary good things that are rationally self-evident for humans and form a basis for holding a stranger accountable for not helping a distressed victim (Legarre 85). Similarly, Aquinas would hold the stranger morally responsible for not helping a person in danger. Natural law theorist believes humans have instincts that compel them to help even if it means risking their lives. Therefore, natural law theorists would find the stranger liable for failing to rescue a drowning victim.
On the contrary, a legal positivist such as H. L. A. Hart would answer the question by examining how society recognizes the doctrine. Legal positivists believe that the existence of the law does not depend on its merits and demerits but on social facts (Schofield 205). That means the legitimacy of the law depends on how it has been decided, posited, ordered, tolerated, or practiced by society. Therefore, the No-Rescue Doctrine could be legally prudent, efficient, and just but not accepted or practiced. However, the availability of previous similar cases applying the No-Rescue Doctrine shows that it has been ordered and practiced in society, meaning the positivist would recognize the admissibility of law. For instance, the No-Rescue principle had been used previously to decide Yania v. Bigan case (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania). Hence, the legal positivist would not find the stranger liable for the damages for not rescuing the drowning victim.
The court, natural law theorists, and legal positivists hold different views when judging the moral responsibility of rescuing a person in distress. The court applies the No-Rescue Doctrine, which refuses to impose the moral duty of saving a person in danger on a stranger. Conversely, natural law theorists believe humans have intrinsic values that influence them to help others in dire situations. Lastly, legal positivists consider the recognition of the law by society to make judgments.
Works Cited
Legarre, Santiago. “HLA Hart and the making of the New Natural Law Theory.” Jurisprudence, vol. 8, no.1, 2017, pp. 82-98. Web.
Schofield, Philip. “Jeremy Bentham and the Origins of Legal.” The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism, edited by Torben Spaak and Patricia Mindus, Cambridge University Press, 2021. Web.
Sterri, Aksel Braanen, and Ole Martin Moen. “The Ethics of Emergencies.” Philosophical Studies, vol. 178, no. 8, 2021, pp. 2621-2634. Web.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Yania v. Bigan. 397 Pa. 316, 1959. United States Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.