Right-to-Work Laws’ Paybacks for Employers and the State
A right-to-work state lacks laws compelling employers to join or pay dues and fees to labor unions. Georgia is an example of a right-to-work state. There are many paybacks a state or an employer gets from residing in a state that does not compel one to belong to a union (Dermine, 2020). Some non-right-to-work laws boost local economic growth, enable employers to eradicate the need for compulsory dues, and offer workers more competitive wages. This paper will focus on the paybacks of right-to-work laws for employers and the state.
Right-to-work laws boost local economic growth—many companies like operating in regions that do not compel workers to be union members. The majority of companies aim at avoiding unionization. Consequently, there will be more companies in right-to-work states hence more job opportunities. The increment in job opportunities would lower the unemployment rate in such conditions. With the rise in the number of people earning income, the investment level will also grow, further increasing employment in the respective state (Bueno, Binder & Nowak, 2022). The living standards of the residents would gradually rise. As a result, they are increasing their purchasing power, creating a suitable environment for businesses to thrive.
Right-to-work laws eliminate the need for mandatory dues. Many unions collect five hundred to one thousand dollars in dues annually from workers, exploiting the workers economically. Some associations are aligned to a particular political organization, whereas the worker may have a contrary political affiliation. Without the right-to-work laws, workers may be compelled to join the union or look for another job. Due to the lack of will from the workers, they may end up performing poorly in their careers, inconveniencing their employers (Gondhalekar & Kessler, 2021). Their employers may incur losses or even be compelled to shut down the business because of bankruptcy. Without compulsory union membership, companies can hire workers committed to their jobs, thus enabling them to generate profit.
Right-to-work laws enable employers to maintain competitiveness in the workplace. Labor unions may compel the employer to pay the workers based on their qualifications rather than their performance. Right-to-work laws enable the employer to sign a performance contract with the workers in which one will be paid depending on the quality of services offered (Bueno et al., 2022). The move will compel workers to deliver high-quality services to get a pay rise. Using one’s performance contract rather than academic qualification will promote competitiveness at the workplace, eventually leading to the growth of the business or industry.
On the other side, right-to-work laws render the employee vulnerable to the employer. The employee is not protected; hence the employer may use that opportunity to exploit the employee (Gondhalekar & Kessler, 2021). The employer may subject the employee too long working hours. The employer may even offer low wages to the employees. The job security of the employee is at risk. The employer may decide to fire the employee at will since there is no legal obligation compelling the employer to give reasons for termination.
In conclusion, the benefits of the right-to-work laws outweigh their disadvantages; hence efficient for both employers and the state. It can be shown that right-to-work laws promote local economic growth and competitiveness at the workplace and eliminate the need for mandatory dues. It is, therefore, more suitable for one to work in a right-to-work state since the person has the freedom to choose whether or not to join a union, depending on its financial viability.
References
Bueno, N., Binder, C., & Nowak, M. (2022). Right to Work. Web.
Dermine, E. (2020). The right to work: a justification for welfare to work? In Welfare to Work in the Contemporary European Welfare States. Policy Press. 23(4), 23-30, 49-66. Web.
Gondhalekar, V., & Kessler, L. (2021). Right-to-Work Laws: A Brief Review. Available at SSRN, 3(8), 87-29. Web.