Aspects of the Sherman Antitrust Act

Introduction

To execute a real estate deal in February 1991, the accused required a loan. In due diligence, Ms. Joan Williams ultimately agreed to finance the plaintiff the $6,000 needed to close the escrow because failing to do so would cause her to lose the active agreements (Pazarbasioglu, 2020). In order to pay back a debt, Ms. Williams received a cheque for $6,000 first from the defendant’s lawyer on February 15, 1991. (Foster, 2021). The plaintiff was instructed by the respondent not to transfer the cheque unless she confirmed there were monies in the account that day. Foster (2021) continues by stating that Ms. Williams discovered the report had been sealed on March 8, 1991, as well as a month prior to that date, it had a lump sump after making repeated efforts to cash the check.

Discussion

The controversy, in this case, originates from New Jersey Statutory Section 2A:111-15. It asserts that signing a bad check is a felony that can only be prosecuted if there is sufficient evidence to back up the charge. The defendant asserted that the declaration was post-dated and that MS Williams had never been the intended victim of fraud. She ought not to be found guilty of breaking this law, either. The court determined that the jurors were properly informed. It found that perhaps the State just needed to demonstrate beyond all reasonable doubt that perhaps the check was tendered for repayments with no intentions of honoring it and that the goal to deceive is irrelevant.

The defendant misconstrued N.J.S.A. 2A:111-15, the previous back check law. Firstly, the rule makes no mention of the check being issued with the intent to defraud. The claim that post comments are immune to the law is also only valid if the drawer is willing to uphold it. The trial judge instructed the jury to review the evidence pertaining to the previously listed conditions. The State just had to demonstrate beyond possible suspicion that the check was written without the purpose of honoring it as a settlement for the debt.

The jurors were instructed to look into the case. It is critical to consider when the cheque was distributed. If it was delivered on the 15th, the administration just needs to demonstrate the purpose of disregarding the proclamation. Nevertheless, if the check was issued on the 10th as well as the thread for the 15th, the State must demonstrate that Plaintiff knew at the time the cheque was issued that it would not be honored later. In this scenario, the motive to defraud is irrelevant. The California Supreme Court decided that the jury was properly informed.

Vertical restraints of trade are agreements between firms at different levels of the same industry that limit competition, such as exclusive dealing agreements or agreements to fix prices. The antitrust laws relate to the ATT Tmobile- and Tmobile Sprint merger because the merger would reduce competition in the wireless market and lead to higher consumer prices.

The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has taken action against several major pharmaceutical companies for antitrust violations. The Antitrust Division is responsible for enforcing the antitrust laws, which promote competition and protect consumers (Blair et al., 2022). The Division has brought antitrust actions against several major pharmaceutical companies for violating these laws. The Division’s efforts against these companies have resulted in significant fines and other penalties.

In addition, the Division has obtained court orders requiring these companies to change their practices to restore competition. Blair et al (2022) document, that in 2010, the D.O.J. filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against AstraZeneca, alleging that the company had engaged in anticompetitive conduct to delay generic competition for its heartburn medication Nexium. In 2012, the D.O.J. reached a settlement with Pfizer, in which the company agreed to pay $490 million to resolve allegations that it had engaged in anticompetitive conduct to delay generic competition for its cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor (Blair et al., 2022). This conduct delayed cheaper generic versions of Lipitor from reaching consumers and caused consumers to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more for the brand-name drug. In 2016, the D.O.J. reached a settlement with Mylan, in which the company agreed to pay $465 million to resolve allegations that it had engaged in anticompetitive conduct to delay generic competition for its epinephrine auto-injector EpiPen.

The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has taken action against several Big Tech and Social Media companies for antitrust violations. Antitrust laws protect competition in the marketplace and consumers from anticompetitive practices. The Antitrust Division has taken action against several Big Tech and Social Media companies for antitrust violations (Carrier, 2020). These companies have used their market power to engage in anticompetitive practices, such as imposing unfair terms on developers, restricting access to data, and engaging in self-preferencing.

Conclusion

The Antitrust Division is committed to protecting competition in the marketplace and will continue to take action against companies that violate antitrust laws. D.O.J. filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Google in 2010. It was alleged that the company had engaged in anticompetitive conduct to maintain its monopoly power in the search market (Gundlach et al) In 2013, the D.O.J. settled with Apple. The company agreed to pay $450 million to resolve allegations that it had engaged in anticompetitive conduct to fix prices in the e-books market. Carrier, 2020 continues that in 2016, the D.O.J. settled with Facebook. The company agreed to pay $20 million to resolve allegations that it had engaged in anticompetitive conduct to stifle competition in the social networking market.

References

Blair, R. D., Durrance, C. P., & Angerhofer, T. J. (2022). Antitrust policy in health care markets. Cambridge University Press.

Carrier, M. A. (2020). Big tech, antitrust, and breakup. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2020).

Foster, C. (2021). Varieties of neoliberalism: courts, competition paradigms and the Atlantic divide in anti-trust. Socio-Economic Review.

Gundlach, G., Frankel, R., & Krotz, R. Journal of supply chain management. Supply Chain Management, 55(2).

Pazarbasioglu, C., Mora, A. G., Uttamchandani, M., Natarajan, H., Feyen, E., & Saal, M. (2020). Digital financial services. World Bank, 54.