Policing is a key element in efforts to enhance regional security and stability. There are clear challenges that traditional incident-based law enforcement models face in dealing with today’s dangers and threats. Difficulties also exist in responding to new opportunities for crime. They may be due, among other things, to increased population mobility and migration, rapid technological and communication changes, the free movement of goods and services, and growing income inequality.
Violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (VERLT), as well as terrorist attacks in recent years, highlight the need for the exchange, integration, and centralized analysis of relevant data and information (intelligence materials). According to national laws, international human rights standards, and OSCE commitments, that should occur at all levels. The intelligence-led policing (ILP) model has been developed as a response to these growing challenges. Based on and with the help of this model, it is possible to reorient law enforcement from a traditional response to a proactive one.
The model has proven to be an effective tool for combating organized crime, better resource management, and targeted identification and resolution of priority issues. ILP’s proactive and future-oriented approach contributes to preventing, reducing, disrupting, and eliminating crime. A key element in the ILP method is the systematic collection and analysis of information and data related to preventing, reducing, and eliminating crime, followed by the development of operational data (OSCE Guidebook 12). On this basis, informed and forward-looking political and managerial decisions can be made. Resources can be allocated to address the most pressing security issues, threats, types of crime, and criminals. In addition, the ILP has proven to be an effective and consistent tool in the fight against terrorism and VERLT.
The ILP builds a framework for managing criminal intelligence and planned operational work. Intelligence is the basis for setting priorities and strategic and operational goals in the field of suppression and prevention of crime and other security threats (Carter 33). It also includes adopting appropriate decisions in the implementation framework of operational-search activities, the rational involvement of available human resources, and the distribution of material and technical means.
The intelligence-led policing model has been developed to respond to the growing threats in the field of crime control. The ILP systematically collects and evaluates data and information through a well-defined analytical process (Carter 33). As a result, data becomes strategic and operational analytics that serve as the basis for improved evidence-based decision-making.
The intelligence-led policing complements the traditional reactive law enforcement model. ILP is a hierarchical managerial decision-making model, although the exchange of data and information within the model works both bottom-up and top-down. Community policing, in contrast, is a typical bottom-up approach to building trust between the police and the public. According to the ILP model, law enforcement activity is reoriented from the traditional response to the events that have occurred to their pre-emption (OSCE Guidebook 17). This activity model is based on the development by the leadership of the police apparatus of optimal management decisions and immediate response to complications in the operational situation. For this, a systematic collection and analysis of information and data related to preventing, reducing, and eliminating crime is organized in real-time, followed by timely management decisions.
Relationships Between COP and ILP
Even though many agencies report acceptance of the ILP and increased research into the model, there remains significant ambiguity regarding the conceptual basis and proper measurement of ILP. Most scholars agree that the ILP is indeed a unique policing philosophy. However, there is no consensus on the relationship between ILP and the traditional model. Although the ILP is rarely defined, especially because it must evolve as the modern police force develops, Carter (317) conceptualizes the ILP as collecting and analyzing information related to crime. The result is a useful intelligence product designed to help law enforcement develop tactical responses to threats. It also helps in strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.
Based on these broader principles of intelligence gathering, analysis, and deployment to develop strategic and tactical responses to crime threats, ILP demonstrates a high degree of implementation accuracy across agencies. The ILP has made significant strides in recent years and is seen as a spur to the creation of regional hubs. These centers are staffed by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to share intelligence and data between agencies (Carter and Fox 3). Essentially, the purpose of an ILP is to capitalize on the underlying information through both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
It is necessary for the active monitoring and prevention of criminal activity, primarily by identifying common mass offenders and potential threats to the community. The UK Home Office Audit Committee (1993) noted that the ILP uses intelligence from various sources, including surveillance, whistle-blowers, and other agencies (Carter and Fox 4). That was to identify hardened offenders and improve the effectiveness of crime reduction.
Modern definitions of the ILP also reflect a broader operational focus and, according to some scholars, incorporate key components from other philosophies of policing. For example, adopting the National Intelligence Model in the UK led to a shift in ILP (Carter and Fox 2). He has integrated a problem-solving approach and extended the application of the ILP beyond ordinary offenders to a multitude of issues for which the police are responsible. Thus, the ILP may be consistent with other known conceptual philosophies of policing. These include problem-oriented policing (POP) and community-oriented policing (COP). Additionally, uphold the unique principles that distinguish it as a unique model of policing.
Similarities Between Models
In contrast to the traditional reactive law enforcement view of keeping order, COP is a specific philosophy of policing and emphasizes community involvement in crime prevention efforts. COP rose to prominence in the 1990s as a new crime-fighting technique that utilized the combined efforts of law enforcement and the communities they serve (Carter and Fox 4). The main goal of COP is to reduce crime and disorder by proactively identifying and resolving problems through partnerships between the police and the public and other community relations.
Like COP, ILP is a proactive policing philosophy designed to detect and prevent crime. If possible, this happens before they occur or become severe. However, both COP and ILP are just a framework for implementing strategies, not a strategy by themselves. In other words, neither COP nor ILP is intended to be used as a tactic that can be managed to solve an actual question and then abandoned once the goal is achieved. It is more common in POP and traditional reactive policing.
Moreover, since COP and ILP are broader frameworks that can be implemented in different ways across institutions and change over time, defining a specific definition and evaluation of ILP and COP is more challenging (Carter and Fox 4). Other important commonalities are that COP and ILP rely on community information to develop intelligence about potential or current crime problems. Moreover, the two-way flow of information between the police and the public and data for informed evidence-based decision-making.
Differences Between Models
There are several notable differences between intelligence-led policing and community-oriented policing. First and foremost, the COP’s emphasis on community empowerment and building trust in the police is not a central focus of the ILP. In contrast, ILP is a philosophy that uses intelligence and data to identify crime threats and effectively address them objectively. At the same time, more obvious issues, such as young people loitering on a street corner, may attract the attention of community members and become more important to the COP task (Carter and Fox 5). The ILP relies on intelligence and data to prioritize issues that may be more hidden.
These include the human factor and everything related to it, for example, a human trafficking network operating in the neighborhood, which the community usually does not know about. In other words, information from the public is in high demand and value in both the COP and the ILP. Despite this, the objective analysis used to identify the most serious criminal threats is the top priority and the mechanism used for proactive policing under the ILP model.
The ILP also paid special attention to the more serious and numerous offenders. Research shows that prioritizing these cases over others leads to more effective and efficient crime reduction efforts (OSCE Guidebook 12). Conversely, COP tends to focus on neighborhood-level issues based on community input. The ILP model, according to the OSCE Guidebook, encourages law enforcement to work smarter, not harder, in dealing with criminal threats in their community (13). Instead of waiting for small problems to escalate into big ones or only addressing problems after the community has voiced an issue, ILP is committed to using data to reduce, stop and prevent crime. The ILP is not so much reimagining the role of the police as it is reimagining how the police can be smarter in applying their unique powers and capabilities.
Intelligence-driven policing aims to leverage data and intelligence from the community and other institutions. To more effectively, efficiently, and proactively deploy police resources to fight crime and disorder. In addition, to prevent the most serious and numerous criminal threats. In comparison, the main purpose of the COP is to increase public cooperation and perception of police legitimacy to help fight crime and disorder proactively.
Despite the similarities between COP and ILP, US law enforcement appears to implement each strategy as a separate, independent, and unique philosophy rather than a mixture of both structures. This result is considerable because it implies that police departments are generally purposeful in choosing which philosophy to implement. They do not lend themselves to a selection of elements from several philosophies, which can be drawn at will from a wider toolbox. This approach often dilutes the influence of anyone’s philosophy and diverts attention from one single philosophical goal associated with adherence to a single strategy.
Historical Development of Intelligence
Early law enforcement intelligence units dating back to the 1920s used a recording process known as the dossier system. In essence, intelligence files were nothing more than dossiers – files containing a set of various source information. Prohibition-era bootleggers and many notorious criminals of the early twentieth century, such as Bonnie and Clyde, the Barker Gang, and Al Capone, were typical individuals on whom the police agencies kept dossiers (Carter 31). They were mostly about people who were considered criminals, who were considered to be associated with criminals, or individuals who were considered a threat to the safety and order of society.
Little was done in the field of law enforcement intelligence during the depression of the 1930s. Other priorities were higher: the overarching threat to the country was the economy, not a crime. Circumstances began to change in the second half of the decade as communism became predominant (Carter 31). The police believed in the one particular system they knew: the dossier. In 1937, US Representative Martin Dyce, D.T., became the first chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Dice, a supporter of the Ku Klux Klan, fueled the fire in the United States of concern about communism (Burcher and Whelan 4). It included calling people who appeared to be non-American communists, which often resulted in them losing their jobs and functionally moving out of society.
Local law enforcement began to create intelligence files in response to public and government expressions of concern. They were known as red files, targeting suspected communists and communist sympathizers (Carter 32). Therefore, law enforcement agencies kept records of people who expressed their political opinions and those who were identified as sympathizing with these people. The fact that these groups were applying their constitutional rights and not committing crimes was not considered a problem. The presence and support of communism at home were considered a threat to the national security of the United States.
Such a system has become a recognized law enforcement intelligence tool. Therefore, when new overarching problems emerged, it was natural for law enforcement to rely on this well-established mechanism for collecting and storing information. In the 1960s, law enforcement faced two challenges when intelligence dossiers proved to be an important tool: the civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam War movement (Carter 32). In both cases, the participants found themselves on the periphery of mainstream society. They were vocal in their views, and their exhortations and actions seemed un-American to many. Other social trends exacerbated that: the Baby Boomers of World War II were in their early 20s, exploring their new world of sex, drugs, and rock and roll. They help spread the stereotype of ‘long-haired, drug-smoking, commie-hippie spies’ – a prime target for law enforcement.
Law enforcement intelligence is a product of military intelligence and national security intelligence. Military intelligence dates back to ancient times; references to it can be found in Chinese writings, Sun Tzu, and the Bible (Tiimub et al. 31). Security intelligence was adjusted for use in law implementation operations after World War II. The Office of Law Enforcement Assistance of the US Department of Justice published the original intelligence plan in 1971 (Carter 34). Today, the communications intelligence techniques used by the military influence how law enforcement analyzes telephone records. The methods used to manage intelligence sources inform the management of confidential informants.
Influence of the State on the Development of the ILP
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Purposes made a scathing statement about intelligence. It called on law enforcement agencies and states to immediately establish and maintain information gathering and evaluation capabilities (Tonry 122). In addition, disseminate intelligence to protect every individual’s right to privacy. Moreover, limit organized crime and civil unrest note that each state must establish a central collection, analysis, and storage system. It is also necessary to create an intelligence dissemination system in which law enforcement agencies participate by providing information and receiving intelligence from the system.
It went on to say that every agency with more than 75 employees must have a permanent intelligence capability. When first created, intelligence units in law enforcement were not guided by policies that protected civil liberties and prevented intelligence from going over the top. In the 1970s, a number of intelligence units violated best practices (Tonry 122). As a result, some agencies ceased their intelligence functions voluntarily, by court order, or under political pressure.
The Justice Improvement Act of 1979 brought significant changes to the DOJ organizations and spurred regulatory changes, including creating this provision by the DOJ Office of Legal Policy (Carter 34). The ruling arose out of concerns about aggressive intelligence gathering and intelligence activities by state and local law enforcement agencies. These often included collecting and storing information about citizens who expressed unpopular opinions but whose actions were not criminal.
Because the federal government cannot impose policies on state and local governments, the only method such a policy could be used was to make its implementation a condition of receiving federal funds. The resolution contains recommendations for collecting, storing, viewing, distributing, and cleaning criminal intelligence data. Essentially, the provision requires that information identifying a person or entity can be stored in the criminal intelligence system of a state or local law enforcement agency. There must be sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable suspicion that the person or organization is involved in criminal conduct. When this regulation was created, many viewed it as a serious obstacle to effective intelligence operations. However, in hindsight, this regulation proved to be an important tool for protecting the civil rights of citizens without identifying an unjustified burden on intelligence activities.
In 1976, in response to the problem of intelligence abuse, standards were developed that required a criminal predicate to be entered into a criminal intelligence file. During this time, file guidelines were developed for the law enforcement intelligence unit. In addition, guidelines were also created by the California Department of Justice and the New Jersey State Police. Major intelligence initiatives occurred between the late 1970s and the turn of the century (Carter 37). Some of these initiatives, such as the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, did not even use the term intelligence.
The primary basis for intelligence sharing in the 1980s and 1990s was the Criminal Intelligence System Operational Policy (28 CFR Part 23), which was written for use at RISS centers (Carter 34). Throughout the 1990s, there were no national crime commissions, as there had been in the previous three decades. At the same time, there has been a significant increase in government-sponsored research and programs on a wide range of crime-related issues. They are carried out by the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau for the Promotion of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Affairs and Delinquency Prevention. In addition, the Department of Justice’s newest agency, established in 1994, is the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). In many ways, the output of these agencies was a substitute for the National Commissions.
In the 1990s, several federal intelligence and information exchange support centers were established. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) was created in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was established in northern Virginia (Lewandowski et al., “Using a Fusion Center Model” 170). Both had tactical and strategic intelligence duties. At the same time, a system of high-intensity drug trafficking zones (HIDTA) was formed (Lewandowski et al., “Using a Fusion Center Model” 170). It is a collaborative effort and information sharing model at the federal, state, and local levels.
Consequences of Terrorist Attacks on the Development of Plans
A month after September 11, 2001, the IACP Investigation and Operations Committee recommended that its leadership hold an intelligence-sharing summit in March 2002 from the US and Europe (OSCE Guidebook 22). The summit reviewed the Common Criminal Intelligence Plan and the UK National Intelligence Model (NCIS 2000). These were potential intelligence-driven policing schemes in the United States. The key recommendations from the IACP summit were as follows (Carter 45):
- Promote intelligence-based policing.
- Providing a critical counterbalance to civil rights.
- Increase opportunities to build trust.
- Elimination of analytical and information deficit.
- Solve problems with learning and technology.
The main outcome of the summit was the creation of the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG), which includes about 30 intelligence professionals (Carter 44). The GIWG met quarterly in 2003 and developed the National Criminal Intelligence Exchange Plan (NCISP). The plan was released and approved by the US Attorney General in October 2003 and contained 28 recommendations for major changes in policing (Carter 45). By 2004, over 7,100 agencies or agency affiliates were members of the nationwide RISS network. As RISS centers were being developed in 1980, the Law Enforcement Analysts International Association (IALEIA) was formed. Its yearly conferences were held together with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) meetings.
Not all of these commissions dealt directly with the issue of intelligence. However, all called for greater use of a variety of analytical methods to understand crime and criminal justice and help predict crime. It was done in order to prevent – a fundamental design of the exploration process. At the same time, it was noted that it is necessary to study and understand the criminal environment, that is, analysis, as an important tool for catching criminals. Decades later, one of the first clear recommendations for sharing intelligence and information between federal agencies and state and local law enforcement emerged.
The standard is very similar to the recommendation of the National Crime Information Exchange Plan, which was published about thirty years later. Interestingly, the standard notes that information is collected and intelligence is disseminated. The commission’s previous reports did not make this reference to the analysis. Moreover, the attention to privacy included in the standard is also an important component. That is critical to all law enforcement intelligence activities today. In addition, the report of the National Advisory Commission included recommendations regarding the structure and operation of the intelligence functions of state and local law enforcement agencies. These recommendations included the following (Carter 40):
Setting smart functions
- Each state should establish a centralized law enforcement intelligence service with the participation of each state police department.
- States should consider establishing regional intelligence networks in contiguous states to improve criminal intelligence sharing.
- Each local law enforcement agency should establish its intelligence function in accordance with the intelligence function of the respective state.
Intelligence-driven policing (ILP) is a modern law enforcement police model. ILP appeared in the United Kingdom in the 1990s and was used primarily to combat serious and organized crime. It implies operations with smart functions.
- Every state and local intelligence service must support federal agencies.
- To ensure efficiency and effectiveness, operational policies and procedures must be developed for each local, state, and regional intelligence service.
- Each agency must have a designated officer who reports directly to the chief and oversees all intelligence operations.
- Each agency should develop procedures to ensure that intelligence information is properly screened, protected, and disseminated.
As a mechanism for expanding broad information sharing between state and local law enforcement agencies, the concept of intelligence pooling has evolved rapidly. This growth was further spurred when the Information Exchange Environment (ISE) consolidated confluence centers. The association acted as a clearinghouse for critical information on terrorism between law enforcement agencies and other ISE information exchange partners.
Consolidation Centers are a new intelligence structure that most state, local, and local law enforcement (SLTLE) agencies need to understand and interact with. Contrary to intuition, the process of merging and creating fusion centers is more complex than simply changing the organizational functions of an existing law enforcement unit. It involves the development of intelligence data from various resources and the construction of a physical plant. It usually also includes (Carter 169):
- either reengineering the entire conceptual framework of the intelligence function in the agency,
- or the creation of an entirely new organization;
- the involvement of a wide range of people and organizations that will participate in and consume the intelligence function;
- changing staff attitudes and processes;
- the creation of new functional processes and processes for the exchange of information between SLTLE partners;
- it also involves the development of new agreements and functional relationships; the development of new policies and processes;
- implementation of the Intelligence-led police philosophy
The emergence of the Centers
Initially, intelligence fusion centers were commonly referred to as Regional Intelligence Centers (RICs). In the United States, they took many forms, and there was no single model for what an intelligence center did or how it should be organized. They have evolved largely through local initiatives in response to perceived crime, drug trafficking, and/or terrorism threats within a geographic region. The intention was to mobilize the resources and experience of several agencies in the region to address crime issues in different jurisdictions.
It laid the groundwork for the intelligence centers, but there was no incentive to expand the centers apart from the idiosyncratic local crime problems. However, everything changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Carter 170). Due to their demonstrated successes and challenges with information sharing in the fight against terrorism, additional state and local authorities have adopted the concept and begun establishing their centers. State and local governments originally developed these centers. Initially, the federal government, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), saw the value of these initiatives and began providing financial support (Carter 170). The centers of synthesis were about to play an increasingly important role.
There is no one specific model of a fusion center due to the varying needs and environmental characteristics that influence the center’s structure, processes, and products. In states such as Texas and California, the merger center processes will differ significantly from those in Wyoming or Nebraska. It is due to their large territory, large population, and international borders compared to the predominantly landlocked rural states. The integration of intelligence and information focuses on identifying, deterring, and responding to emerging threats and risks, most of them related to terrorism. An added benefit for state, tribal, and local organizations is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism issues (Carter 172):
- Enabling state and local governments to identify better and predict emerging trends in crime, public health, and quality of life.
- Support for targeted law enforcement and other interdisciplinary, proactive, risk-based, and community-driven problem-solving activities.
- Improved delivery of emergency and non-emergency services.
Features of Fusion Centers
Fusion Centers are also structured differently due to legislative or executive mandates in the same line of thought. The Montana All Threat Intelligence Center, for example, should focus on all threats (Carter 172). The New Jersey Intelligence Operations Center includes emergency operations as well as a merger. The Commonwealth Massachusetts Cynical Center focuses on all types of crime. At the same time, the Oregon Terrorism Threat Assessment Network limits its focus on terrorism (Carter 172). The variability in the structures of central centers is wide because of the functional necessity and inherent characteristics of local control and human rights perspectives.
Despite some criticism, the fact that Fusion centers are structured differently is not a weakness but a strength. That demonstrates that each center is designed to meet local and regional needs and best integrate the fusion center with existing organizational components and priorities. It should be noted that there are different operating and functional models of law enforcement in the United States. Fusion Centers are no different because they are part of a state or local government and face different challenges. They are primarily concerned with meeting the unique needs of the jurisdiction they serve.
As a result of the national plans, the confluence centers will serve as a link between the SLTLE and the federal information exchange environment for the exchange of information on terrorism. It will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of information-sharing efforts. Thus, it was recognized that there was a need to define the core baseline operational capabilities used by data centers and major intelligence units in urban areas. In order to meet the information needs of all consumers of various intelligence centers, The Core Capabilities follow the Fusion Center Guidelines structure and provide a comprehensive statement of functional standards and performance expectations.
In its pure form, the center of synthesis is not operational but an auxiliary center based on analysis. The merger process actively seeks to identify criminal and national security threats and prevent them before they arise. In addition, prevention is an integral part of the intelligence process. The difference, however, is that the rally center is usually organized by bringing together representatives of several local, federal, state, or tribal law enforcement agencies (in some cases, the private sector) in one physical location (Carter 175). Each representative should be a conduit for raw information from their agency, who can feed that agency-specific information into the collective pool of information for analysis.
On the other hand, when the synthesis center needs intelligence, the representative is the conduit back to the agency to communicate, monitor, and process new information needs. Similarly, the agency representative ensures that intelligence products and threat information are sent to the parent agency for proper dissemination. Agency representatives may be physically assigned to one of the centers. Still, more often, the agency representative performs its duties at the fusion center along with the officer’s other assignments in their Home Agency. Representatives are also often referred to as terrorism liaison officers or intelligence liaison officers.
One of the reasons that ILP is particularly well suited to addressing homeland security issues is because it emphasizes the analysis and exchange of information. The lack of information exchange between law enforcement agencies at different levels and regions has been indicated as the main reason for the failure to prevent the events of 9/11. The full implementation of ILP requires the exchange of information within and between organizations. Data collection will be impoverished without such sharing, as will the dissemination of information and intelligence.
However, the full implementation of ILP is by no means a simple process. Adopting innovative policing tactics is often difficult, usually requiring significant organizational changes (Lewandowski et al., “The role of people” 2). With high standards of analytical capabilities and links to multiple jurisdictions, ILP is no exception. Thus, ensuring US law enforcement has the analytical capabilities and connectivity needed to implement ILP fully is not easy.
Judging from the limited literature on the analysis of infusion centers and ILPs in general in police agencies, there is some consensus on measuring real results. Researchers believe that analytical activities lack operational value and the ability to inform real results (Lewandowski et al., “The role of people” 2). Synthesis centers are more likely to provide investigative support that lacks critical analysis. Such findings have been supported by other academics studying intelligence-based policing and analytics. Lewandowski et al. concluded that the analytic functions in these units were, in fact, a repackaging of traditional police data and information (“The role of people” 2). While the idea of state and regional collaboration centers is not new to law enforcement, the advent of modern collaboration centers occurred at the same time as the emergence of the ILP in the US. In addition, this fact makes their rapprochement, especially in time. In the highly fragmented US law enforcement environment, the potential for confluence centers to facilitate the adoption of ILPs by providing a form of centralization is of great importance.
Each of the centers is designed to cover a specific geographic area, connecting local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Moreover, they also include emergency services, transport services, and a wide range of private enterprises within this region or region. Furthermore, the ability of these centers to collect, disseminate and analyze raw information can act as a force multiplier that expands analytical capabilities in their areas of activity. Good intelligence analysis is based on diverse valid and reliable raw information. The more reliable the raw information, the more accurate the analytical result that is intelligence (OSCE Guidebook 16). Considering input in terms of bandwidth, a typical law enforcement intelligence unit has a narrow bandwidth. Thus, information is collected from a rather narrow range of sources, which limits both the quality of the analysis and the ability to see the overall picture of the criminal enterprise.
In this way, the more limited the input of raw information, the more limited the quality of the intelligence data. However, the range will be much broader if the number of sources is expanded to include a wide range of agencies representing much broader geographical and jurisdictional parameters. The wider the bandwidth, the greater and more diverse the flow of information. The analysis becomes more accurate and utilitarian with a greater flow of information. As the quality of the analysis improves, the ability to prevent or mitigate the actions of a terrorist or criminal organization increases exponentially.
To date, research on fusion centers has been scarce due to privacy concerns on the part of the fusion center. However, a study that has been completed at fusion centers shows promising signs of increased communication (Lewandowski et al., “Using a Fusion Center Model” 168). Only in case, fusion centers can sell their abilities more to whom they would like service. Using survey data and interviews with 51 state military personnel, it was found that most paratroopers (75%) called the intelligence processing center at least once in the last six months (Lewandowski et al., “Using a Fusion Center Model” 168). Moreover, almost a third (30.7%) called the Fusion Center at least once a month; the information was obtained from a government data center. A survey of police, executives, and the public with different needs found that a majority (75%) rated the state fusion center as moderately helpful or very helpful (Lewandowski et al., “Using a Fusion Center Model” 168). Finally, intelligence products are read daily and are perceived as moderately helpful by recipients.
In short, an intelligence fusion center should be able:
- Access and explore all government databases, including intelligence, regulatory and law enforcement;
- Integrate information found in these databases;
- Make independent judgments about this information; and
The transformation of the organization of society in the context of globalization requires a change in the concept of functioning of the key elements of the mechanism for ensuring national security. Namely, national law enforcement systems and their structural components are police systems. The priority activity of the police authorities in modern conditions is not a punitive function but the provision of law and order and public safety. In addition, it is important to prevent and control crime to provide a wide range of social services to the population. To ensure the state’s sustainable development and to reform the systems that implement the functions of the state, state bodies must have information about the quantitative indicators of their jurisdictional space. Information should include characteristics of the population, territory, level of production, state of trade, availability of natural resources, the financial situation of citizens, and more.
In recent years, big data arrays have been increasingly used to predict the prospects and determine the consequences of reforms. They reflect the many characteristics of the subject matter and allow for analysis and statistical modeling (OSCE Guidebook 45). Such activity is called predictive analytics and is widely used in various spheres of public life. Examples of successful forecasting based on big data analysis are campaigns to optimize production to attract customers or voters, in the case of using forecasting in political technologies. Quantitative indicators are of great importance for planning and analyzing the effectiveness of law enforcement. Based on statistical data on crime, legislative bodies adapt and change legal norms, and supranational institutions develop norms of international law and determine the criteria for qualifying crimes of specific types. In the work of the police authorities of modern states, statistical data and the results of their analysis become the basis for decision-making and forecasting police activities.
In current years, a growing amount of police forces around the world have been using software that uses statistical data to drive their decision-making process: intelligent policing. This approach means that police departments analyze historical statistics to predict in which geographic areas there is an increased likelihood of criminal activity. Predictive policing does not replace conventional policing methods but complements these traditional methods by applying advanced statistical models and algorithms (OSCE Guidebook 18). Traditional methods include, for example, problem-solving policing, intelligence-based policing, or hot-spot policing.
The use of predictive analytics has contributed to the emergence of a new type of practical activity of police agencies – predictive policing. In 2008, in the United States, the Los Angeles Police Department Chief of Police William Bratton began working with the actual directors of the Justice Advancement Bureau and the National Institute of Justice (Perry et al. 37). Its purpose was to explore the concept of predictive policing in the field of crime prevention. The predictive practice has begun to be implemented by police departments in several US states. By 2010, there was speculation that this police activity would allow some crimes to be predicted in the same way that scientists predict earthquakes aftershocks (Perry et al. 37). And in 2011, police predictive activity was named by Time Magazine (USA) as one of the top 50 inventions of 2011 (Perry et al. 38). Its media implementation technology has been described as a revolutionary innovation capable of stopping crime before it starts.
Analysis of statistical information is used to identify areas with an increased likelihood of criminal activity. The analysis is based on a matrix of hot spots, which allows for Spatio-temporal orientation in processes that can lead to a decrease or increase in crime. Predictions based on these analytical tools allow you to speed up the process of crime analysis. Namely, to choose the right perspective of decision-making by law enforcement agencies, calculate the best options for the use of forces and means, and determine the effectiveness of resources to prevent criminal behavior.
The possibilities of using predictive analytics in law enforcement are very wide. Through predictive analytics can be implemented (Carter 194):
- detection of fraudulent schemes: predictive analysis tools help to minimize the use of fraudulent schemes for insurance and obtaining a loan;
- search for links between criminals: analysis of big data with a high degree of probability identifies members of an organized crime community based on various relationships;
- identification of crime zones: predictive analysis allows law enforcement agencies to identify areas of the city in which there is the highest risk of crime;
- prediction of specific crimes: using the analysis of big data, including visual ones, special algorithms created using machine learning technologies are able to determine: who, and sometimes when and where, will commit a crime.
The use of statistical models can make a huge difference in reducing crime and making cities safer. Indeed, some cases in the United States show that predictive police software reduces crime rates. For example, using historical data, the Richmond Police Department attempted to predict where a New Year’s Eve shooting in 2003 would take place. The team adapted their observation routes to these forecasts based on the results. It was considered a success: accidental shooting that night was reduced by 47%, 246% more weapons were seized, and the police became more efficient as $15,000 was saved (Meijer and Wessels 1). However, there are also indications that predictive policing may be seriously flawed. When predictive models are used, crime prediction no longer depends on theory but takes a large amount of available data as its starting point. These models can lead to a possibly distorted portrayal of society and criminal behavior as they tend to be removed. The risk here is that intelligent policing can lead to less effective and possibly even discriminatory police intervention.
Definition of Predictive Policing
There is no unanimous definition of predictive policing in the literature, but there is consensus on its key features. Many articles point out that predictive policing entails applying quantitative methods to predict possible criminal activity locations in the (near) future. Predictions based on these analytical tools can guide law enforcement decision-making, especially when deploying their personnel. It can be argued that police predictive activity is a concept of policing that is built on the assumption that it is possible to predict when and where crimes will occur again in the future. That uses complex computer analysis of information about previously committed crimes. The goal is to identify individuals and predict their illegal behavior. In addition, they are identifying geospatial areas with an increased likelihood of criminal activity, assisting in developing strategies and the choice of tactics for police intervention in criminogenic situations. The predictive activities of police agencies are increasingly being used in a variety of ways.
An example of such a program is the PredPol software developed by scientists at the University of California in collaboration with the Los Angeles Police Department. PredPol uses only three variables: the type, time, and place of the adverse event; the identity of offenders is not processed (Williams et al. 321). PredPol is an analytical tool that tells police officers which areas to focus on (hot spot). In order to extinguish criminal activity in advance on the territory of a law enforcement agency, and also provides generalized data on the state of crime in the area.
The concerns associated with predictive policing are mainly due to the lack of transparency of predictive models. It has implications for both the effectiveness and accountability of these models. If police officers do not understand why predictive algorithms produce certain results or how their patrol routes are configured, they may not know how to react in certain situations or how to act. That can reduce the effectiveness of geospatial forecasts of forecasting software. Furthermore, when predictive models are not transparent, police departments can potentially no longer legitimize their decisions. At the same time, it should be remembered that electronic statistical information does not consider the motives and true motives of potential criminals and does not consider people’s intentional states (Carter 105). But just one person can seriously destabilize the social order by his actions. A lone terrorist, for example, must demand the maximum concentration of police attention, being on full combat readiness – immediate response.
As far as the experience of police predictive activity already accumulated shows, in these cases, errors are possible due to the bias of randomness. They can lead to too many false positives, for example, identifying an unjustified number of innocent people as terrorists. When making predictions about personality traits, her behavioral characteristics and connections established with other people are not taken into account (OSCE Guidebook 27). Therefore, there are grounds for asserting that the predictive activity of the police is aimed mainly at maintaining social peace and order and not at a specific offender.
Predictive analysis is a critical thinking methodology that combines known quantitative and qualitative variables. It incorporates incidents, events, and political and social dynamics into a logical prediction of threat parameters (Perry et al. 46). At the same time, it should be remembered that it is practically impossible to truly predict events based on human behavior and the infinite number of variables that can affect this behavior. The process is a probabilistic analytical exercise that collects a variety of data, constantly monitors changes in the data, and refines the forecast based on new inputs.
Thus, predictive policing has proven to be highly effective in developing anti-crime strategies. Predictive activity does not replace traditional methods and directions of police work but enhances them by applying advanced statistical models and algorithms. This model of the police in the face of growing resource constraints allows you to save budgetary funds and, at the same time, fulfill the tasks assigned to the police. Such activities require a new way of thinking, a high level of automation, and expansion of the technological capabilities of mass surveillance. Only under such conditions is it possible to create a police system that can meet the modern demands of society.
Like the exploration process itself, predictive analysis is iterative, constantly looking for new inputs to refine the forecast. Predictive analysis in law enforcement can have the greatest impact on strategic intelligence. However, it can also be of use to help determine ongoing intelligence requirements. This analytical method will not predict threats in isolation, but it can predict changes in the environment that may change the conditions that give rise to threats.
Much of today’s understanding of public-private partnerships has been shaped by initiatives related to the development of the European Union. A brief look at the history of development provides a certain perspective. As a means of increasing their economic power on a global scale, 13 Western European countries developed an agreement that was originally known as the European Economic Commonwealth (Carter 206). It has become the European Community and, as we know it today, the European Union. One of the foundations for developing a viable and economically strong union of diverse, multilingual governments was the use of public-private partnerships. The framework developed by the European Union is widely used in the US.
Conceptually, it can be argued that the idea of public-private partnership in law enforcement goes back to a single one. It is one of the most fundamental principles of policing, formulated by Sir Robert Peel in 1829 in the United Kingdom (Carter 203). Peale noted that the government alone could not fulfill all policing duties – members of the public and, by extension, private businesses need help to protect communities from crime. Indeed, Peale argued that in a democratic society, the police derive their authority from the people (Carter 203). Therefore, the public has an obligation to assist the police in matters of public safety. His principle: the police are the public, and the public is the police, which implies mutual responsibility.
Traditionally, the relationship between law enforcement and the private sector regarding anti-crime and public safety initiatives has been relatively superficial. Typically, such initiatives were linked to crime issues that were largely idiosyncratic to the community (Lewandowski et al., “The role of people” 10). In some cases, the relationship between law enforcement and the private sector has even been contentious. For example, security companies and law enforcement often have problems responding to false positives. In the same way, professional disagreements arise between law enforcement agencies and private detectives or security guards. Often, they happen to law enforcement agencies who, in desperation, view these two groups as copycats of the police.
Extending the concept of public-private partnership to public safety and security issues, the report of the European Commission states the following. Security is a fundamental right, which means that the state is responsible for maintaining this right. Four concepts are important in this regard (Carter 205):
- If there is a particular risk, the responsible persons must take the necessary measures.
- Problems at the local level must be resolved with the general approval of all actors, both public and private.
- Repression is not the only solution; prevention needs to be developed.
- The state cannot solve security problems in society alone.
Three conditions for effective partnerships have also been formulated for the functioning of public-private partnerships (Carter 205):
- Fortification and territorial arrangement adapted to the history of the community and its administrative and social reality.
- Work methodically: this means not waiting for a crisis before starting to work together, meeting regularly, planning meeting processes, and using tools agreed upon by all partners to collect information.
- Effective collaboration includes a willingness to listen, get to know each other, respect each other, acknowledge each partner’s limitations, and share useful information, leading to discretion, confidentiality, and a willingness to share information.
The creation of the Information-Sharing Environment (ISE) has become a new challenge for both law enforcement and the private sector. The ISE is a formal set of guidelines and processes for improving intelligence sharing across five critical sectors:
- Intelligence community;
- Federal law enforcement agencies;
- State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
- Private sector; and
- Foreign partners.
Recognized the need to go beyond individual solutions to create an environment – a set of legal, political, cultural, organizational, and technological conditions – to improve the exchange of information. The innovative Terrorism Prevention Act and Intelligence Reform of 2004 were signed. The act demands the president to build an ISE information exchange environment for exchanging information about terrorism with applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties (Carter 209). Based on this legislative mandate, the ISE Program Manager led the development of an implementation plan to provide a mechanism by which the ISE will fulfill its legislative mandate. The most important starting point was the definition of the vision, which, in fact, became the final goal of the ISE.
Public-Private Partnerships Principles
Public-private partnerships is designed to prevent or mitigate criminal and national security threats to the community through a two-way flow of raw information and intelligence. In its National Security Policy Statement, the National Governors Association noted that private sector partners play a key role in providing expertise, technology, and infrastructure resources to keep our country safe and secure (Carter 211). Consideration must be given to the role of the business community and the impact on the community’s economic viability in the event of a terrorist attack. One way to understand the goals of the private sector in a community is to use the framework that DHS relies on to identify critical infrastructures and key resources. Some national infrastructures are so vital that their failure or destruction would have a detrimental effect on economic security or the defense of the United States. These include:
- Storage and transportation of gas and oil
- Power systems
- Banking and finance
- Water supply systems
- Continuity of government.
- Emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue services)
Modern Development of Public-Private Partnership
The processes for developing and implementing public-private partnerships were described, as well as the problems that would have to be faced. Even with the value of P3I, such partnerships require creativity, collaboration, and flexibility from all parties in order to develop effectively. There will be issues that lack a clear direction to address and new relationships that will change the status quo. However, the value generated can go a long way in protecting our communities.
For example, virtual public-private partnerships (VP3) are a relatively new phenomenon. The term Virtual Public-Private Partnership, or VP3, which will be widely used in this dissertation, refers to public-private partnerships using the Internet as its primary means of communication and information exchange (Simeone 4). There are a number of reasons why a broad attitude to information sharing is beneficial for law enforcement. First, all crimes, all threats, all dangers VP3 offers a wider range of potential consumers. It helps expand the intelligence network and increase the potential range from which data collection can eventually occur (Simeone 4). Second, trying to distinguish terrorism from crime is counterproductive. At its most essential level, crime prevention is also the prevention of terrorism. Three initiatives were briefly reviewed: the New York City Police Department’s APPL program, Watchmail of the Irvine Police Department, and the Metropolitan Atlanta Technology Crime Task Force, MetroTech (Simeone 4). It also briefly reviews the Nassau County Police Department Security or Police Information Network. However, none of these programs have yet been the subject of serious academic review.
Public-Private Partnerships (P3I) are voluntary collaborative relationships between various actors in both the public and private (non-public) sectors. All participants agree to work together towards a common goal or specific objectives. Partnerships can serve various purposes, including advancing a cause, implementing regulatory standards or codes of conduct, or sharing and coordinating expertise and resources. They may be based on of a certain single activity or develop into a set of activities or even into a strong alliance that ensures consensus and accountability with each collaborating organization and its stakeholders. Although they vary considerably, such partnerships are usually established as a structured collaborative effort with shared responsibilities as well as properties, expertise, and other benefits.
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